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THE NEW CRIMINAL PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
IN OHIO: AN HISTORICAL CONTRAST
R. OTTO MELETZKE*
A far-reaching reorganization and standardization of criminal pro-
cedure in Ohio was enacted by the 103d General Assembly with the pas-
sage of Amended Senate Bill No. 73 effective January 1, 1960 "...
making practice and procedure in the trial of criminal offenses uniform in
courts inferior to the court of common pleas." Although the Bill directly
affects matters of arrest, bail, and the trial of misdemeanors,' the key pro-
visions have the effect of revising the criminal preliminary examination in
Ohio for the first time in ninety years.
In Ohio the preliminary examination is held almost exclusively be-
fore county or municipal court magistrates,2 since after January 1, 1960
mayors will no longer have this capacity,8 and there existed in 1959 only
two police courts, at Marietta and Ottawa Hills. The purpose of the ex-
amination is twofold. It provides a procedure inquiring in character, but
adversary in form4 designed to make possible the summary disposition of
misdemeanors: few serious legal issues are presented by this part of the
examination's function at the present time5 outside of problems of volume
* Member of the Ohio Bar.
1Amended Senate Bill No. 73 embraces Chapter 2935, Arrest; Chapter 2937,
Arraignment-Preliminary Examination-Bail; Chapter 2938, Trial of Misde-
meanors and Ordinance Offenses in Courts Inferior to the Court of Common Pleas.
The scope of this article is limited to the preliminary examination section of
Chapter 2937.
2The county court magistrate may hear all felony and misdeameanor exami-
nations which arose in his district, and those cases within the county where he sits,
if special circumstances exist, see OHIO REV. CODE § 2931.02 (1958). The munici-
pal court magistrate has territorial jurisdiction over misdemeanors, jurisdiction
over crimes committed within the county wide jurisdiction of county courts, and
power to hear all felony cases committed within its territory, see OHIO REV. CODE
§ 1901.20 (1953). Mayor's courts have qualified misdemeanor jurisdiction, see
OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1905.02-.19 (1953). Ohio's two police courts have, in general,
municipal misdemeanor jurisdiction, see OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1903.06-.20 (1953).
3 OHIO REV. CODE § 1907.031 (1958).
4 In England the process was founded upon inquisitorial power, Statute, 1554,
1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 § 4. See HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 529 (1923),
1 STEPHEN HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWV OF ENGLAND 217 (1883). In France,
the juge d'instruction has broad investigatory and interrogatory powers unlike
American procedure. See Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime in
France, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 385, 693 (1940) ; Freed, Aspects of French Criminal Pro-
cedure, 17 LA. L. REv. 730 (1957).
5 Where a magistrate did not have jurisdiction over a particular misdemean-
or, he could only, in past practice, conduct a preliminary examination. See Sprague
v. State ex rel. Staples, 34 Ohio App. 354, 171 N.E. 259 (1930); State ex rel.
Overholser v. Wolf, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 415 (1927); Rockwell v. State, 2 Ohio L. Abs.
666 (1924). See also 29 OHIo JUR. Municipal Courts § 60 (1933). OHIO REv.
CODE § 1907.012 (1958), gives final misdemeanor jurisdiction to the county courts.
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brought about by traffic offense jurisdiction. The second, and more im-
portant function of the examination is the determination of whether there
is "probable cause" to hold a person accused of a felony for appearance
before the grand jury for possible indictment, the Ohio Constitutional re-
quirement for felony prosecutions.6
Problems raised in the past administration of criminal justice have
shown beyond a doubt that laws, as well as those who champion their
spirit, must be geared to the issues of the day. This is particularly true of
the preliminary examination. While one hundred years ago the informality
of criminal process might have been justified by the infrequency of injus-
tice, conditions of our day demand the clear, orderly, and just administra-
tion of our criminal procedure.
The draftsmen of the reorganization Bill-a sub-committee of the
Criminal Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association--created a
meeting ground of theory and practice articulated in clear concise statu-
tory form. The language of the past, scattered about in sometimes un-
related parts of the Code created disorganization in practice. The new
reorganization yields a fresh, step-by-step modem preliminary examina-
tion.
While in the past, legal assistance was often engaged at a time too
late in the criminal process to make effective use of the preliminary ex-
amination, the new procedure will offer the accused more reason to re-
quire counsel at the examination, in every kind of case. Defense counsel
and prosecution alike will therefore be faced with new problems of sub-
stance, as well as with the new procedure, creating a significant impact
upon criminal practice.
The true emphasis of the reorganization is characterized in the fol-
lowing discussion by a comparative analysis of the historic foundations of
the preliminary examination in Ohio and its development, to be contrasted
with a structural classification of the new procedure. By such a dual
separation the growth and origin of the procedure is stressed and the nexus
between old and new adds a visible background, if not material substance
to the meaning and purpose of the preliminary examination in present day
practice.
HISTORICAL BASES
Colonial Influence Experience of early legal structures in our country
profoundly influenced the succeeding territorial and state governments.
Patterned after that of the mother country, colonial criminal procedure
was first governed by English precedent; a basis for a preliminary exam-
6 OHIO CONsT. art., 1 § 10 (1851). See interpretation in Stewart v. State, 41
Ohio App. 351, 181 N.E. 111 (1932). In Ohio the felony misdemeanor distinction
rests only upon possible punishment: "Offenses which may be punished by death
or by imprisonment in the penitentiary are felonies; all other offenses are mis-
demeanors. As used in the Revised Code 'minor offense' is synonymous with mis-
demeanor." OHIO RaV. CODE § 1.06 (1953).
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ination is traceable in England even as far back as 1194, the coroner's in-
quest.' For example, criminal practice in the Virginia Colony involved two
preliminary steps. One charged with a felony who could not furnish bail
was first taken before a justice of the peace, and held in custody until he
was discharged by "due Course of Law." This meant punishment and
release, remedial proceedings in habeas corpus, or the important procedure
of the Examining Court, or "called court" as it was then termed-the
second step. The theory of the Examining Court was basically English,
but the Colonial counterpart during the 1600's-and formally organized
in 1705-was a unique departure from English practice. The English
model was geographically permanent; the Colonial derivation travelled
to the location of imprisonment. Since all serious criminal trials were held
at the capital in Williamsburg, travel was expensive and time-consuming.
The Examining Court was the "sifting process" that assured reasonable
probability of conviction when an accused was sent for trial. A justice of
the peace confronted with one charged with a serious crime directed the
sheriff to summon an Examining Court within a fixed period of time.
Upon arrival of the court, witnesses-including the accused's own if he
so desired-were questioned. The accused was questioned not under oath.
Testimony was recorded and witnesses were required to give bond if the
court decided to send the prisoner to the capital.8
Ohio: The Northwest Territory When Territorial government was
organized in 1787, substantive criminal law and enforcement procedure
were drawn with close reference to Colonial examples. Within the Ter-
ritorial judicial structure,' the justice of the peace court was the most
important at the first stage of criminal procedure. While jurisdiction in
the disposition of cases was limited,' ° the justice did sit as a preliminary
examiner, and could take recognizance-bail-for the appearance of the
7 1 STEPHEN, supra note 4.
8 SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 55 (1930), "... Besides dis-
charging a person or remanding him for trial for his life, the Examining Court
might bind him over to the next grand jury at the County Court." Scott cites,
supra at 60, n. 41 some interesting history: "Orange County Examining Courts,
1735-75 (174041 missing) ; thirty-seven years. Sixty-one called courts to examine
79 criminals, 3 of whom were examined on two different charges in different
years. Of these 82 cases, 33 were held for trial at Williamsburg; 14 were whipped
by the Examining Court and discharged; 12 were held to the county grand jury;
and 23 were discharged. Figures compiled from the County Recs. (MSS)."
9LAws OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY, ch.2, Aug. 23, 1788 established the
Territorial courts: (a) Justice of the Peace, jurisdiction over petit crimes and
misdemeanors; (b) Courts of Quarter Sessions of the Peace (the Justices of the
Peace were part of this court, and when out of term had jurisdiction for petit
crimes and misdemeanors) had power to hear, determine, and sentence all crimes
and misdemeanors of any kind or nature; (c) County Courts of Common Pleas,
civil jurisdiction only; (d) Probate Courts, jurisdiction over intestate and testate
property matters; (e) General Court, jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters,
meeting only four times yearly durng the early years.
10 LAWS OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY, ch.2, Aug. 23, 1788.
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accused at the upper court. 1798 Territorial legislation adopted from the
Massachussets Code fixed the first examining jurisdiction:
. . . the justices of the peace shall examine into all homicides
murders, treasons and felonies done and committed in their
respective counties and commit to prison all persons guilty or
suspected to be guilty of manslaughter, murder, treason or
other capital offence and to hold to bail all persons guilty or
suspected to be guilty of lesser offenses which are not cogniz-
able by a justice of the peace . . . and . . . examine into all
other crimes, matters and offences which by particular laws are
put within their jurisdiction. 11
The Territorial period of fifteen years witnessed no attempt to
broaden the preliminary procedure. The Virginia Examining Court de-
vice apparently was not then necessary because of the minute territorial
population, contrasted with almost one hundred years of Colonial inhabita-
tion in Virginia.
Ohio Statehood: The Early Experience Ohio became a state in the
latter part of 1802, and the First General Assembly which met on
March 1, 1803, abolished all Territorial Courts 2 and repealed the ex-
isting modes of criminal procedure.' 3 Common Pleas courts were given
outstanding criminal jurisdiction except for capital crimes which were to
be tried exclusively in the Supreme Court.'4
Judicial organization and population growth were important factors
in the shift in criminal procedure which developed from the early years
of statehood until 1869. Preliminary examination developed into two
distinct types of procedures. First, the established procedure of justice of
the peace "examination"' 15 was gradually augumented. Second, the very
important procedure of the Examining Courts was created.
The Justice of the Peace
As in the Territorial days, the justice of the peace was given an in-
quisitorial power over those accused persons properly before his court.
1 1 LAWS OF THE NORTHWEsT TERRITORY, ch. 77, May 1, 1798. For an interesting
historical discussion of statutory effect of English law, see POLLACK, OHIO UN-
REPORTED JUDIcIAL DECISIONS 204-219 (1952).
12 OHIO LAws, ch. 7 § 28, April 15, 1803.
13 LAWS OF THE NORTH EST TERRITORY, ch. 77, May 1, 1798 repealed by OHIO
LAws, ch. 47 § 24, Feb. 17, 1804, and OHIO LAWS, ch. 113 § 1, Feb. 22, 1805.
14 Omo LAWS, ch. 7 § 4, April 15, 1803.
15The statutory language remained unchanged, the repeal and reenactment
as follows, from 1804 through 1824: OHIO LAWS, ch. 47, Feb. 17, 1804, infra note 16,
repealed and substance re-enacted by OHIO LAWS, ch. 54, Feb. 12, 1805. The latter
chapter was amended by OHIO LAws, ch. 124, Jan. 22, 1806 (non-criminal) ; both
chapters 54 and 124 amended by OHIO LAWS, ch. 174, Feb. 20, 1808 (non-criminal).
OHIO LAWS ch. 179, Feb. 18, 1809 repealed and substantially re-enacted OHIO LAWS
ch. 54, 124, 174. OHIO LAWS, ch. 327, Feb. 11, 1814 repealed and re-enacted sub-
stance of chapter 179. OHIO LAws, ch. 475, Feb. 16, 1820 repealed and re-enacted
chapter 327. OHIO LAWS ch. 636, Feb. 25, 1824 repealed and re-enacted substance
of chapter 475.
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General statutory authority was for many years the only basis for pre-
liminary examination, the foundation for the now departed justice of the
peace and present county court procedure.' 6
• . . and they are hereby authorized and required on view or
complaint made, on oath, to cause any person, charged with a
crime, or a breach of the laws of this state, to be arrested and
brought before him or some other justice of the peace . . . and
such person to commit, discharge or let to bail, as the nature
of the case may require...l1
Although justice jurisdiction was realigned in 1831,8 the status of
of the procedure remained the same through 1869, with some additions,
19
and represents no marked variance with today's county courts. Final juris-
diction of the justice courts was, of course, limited.2"
The Examining Court
Because of the limits placed upon justice of the peace final juris-
diction, many persons accused of crime were placed in jail following the
justice's "inquiry." Many, of course were never afforded this first step,
but even held in jail without any hearing. This lack or protection and
formalism in the justice courts led to the creation of a special Examining
Court in 1806 composed of the associate judges of the court of common
pleas; an adoption of the Virginia example. Cases involving possible capi-
tal punishment required this examination; in other cases, both felony and
misdemeanor, the examination could be demanded. The provision for capi-
tal offenses illustrates the mode of procedure:
That when any person . . . shall be charged with any capital
offence and apprehended for the same, he . . . shall have a
special court of common pleas within fifteen days after he...
shall be apprehended; and the associate judges are hereby re-
quired, within fifteen days after any person . . . shall be so
charged and apprehended, to hold a court for the purpose of
hearing testimony for and against the said criminal . . . and if
the said court shall be of the opinion from the testimony, that
it is not sufficient to create a suspicion of guilt, then the said
court shall dismiss such criminal . . . but if the said court shall
be of opinion that the testimony is sufficient to create a suspi-
cion of guilt, then the said court shall admit such criminal
16 See note 31 (b) infra.
17 OHIO LAws, ch. 47 § 1, Feb. 17, 1804.
18 OHio LAWS, ch. 837, March 11, 1831, repealing OHiO LAWS, ch. 636, supra
note 15.
19 35 OHio LAWS 87, March 27, 1837 repealed OHIO LAWS, ch. 837, supra note
18, and substantially re-enacted the same. 53 OHIo LAWS 37, March 29, 1856
added section 46 to the act, affixing punishment on a plea of guilty, or discretion
to recognize to the upper court.
20 In criminal proceedings the justice of the peace court, from its inception
in 1788, see note 9 supra, to its abolishment in 1957, had only final misdemeanor
jurisdiction in some cases, general in the early years and limited later with the
establishment of police and municipal courts.
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* . to bail (the sufficiency of which the court shall determine)
or confine him . . . in the jail of the proper county, for his ...
further trial; and after any person or persons shall be let to
bail, or confined for further trial, it shall be the duty of the
prosecuting attorney to proceed as heretofore required. 2
This Examining Court, like the Virginia "called court", was a
travelling court, upon notice and call. The practical reasons for its adop-
tion stem from the fact that a preliminary process was necessary to pre-
vent groundless prosecutions in the criminal courts, and the accused needed
more protection than was previously afforded.
In the following years, clarification and extension of policy gave the
Examining Court a wider scope.22 An important variation was enacted
in 1852, when one judge of the Probate Court was substituted for the
associate judges of the common pleas court 2 -the basis for the present
day Examining Court.
Ohio Rezuision: 1869 With the formative years in the past, Ohio in
1869 embarked upon an era of procedural organization. The first Code
of Criminal Procedure of Ohio was instituted by the General Assembly
on May 6, 1869.24 Justice of the peace procedure remained substantially
21 OHIO LAWS ch. 125 § 3, Jan. 27, 1806. There is a decided possibility that
the English origin of the Examining Court developed from the ancient writ of
de odio et a!ia, referred to in the Magna Charta, prior to the year 1000, see 1
STEPHEN, supra note 4 at 242 ". . . it is at all events clear that the effect of the
writ was to cause a preliminary trial to take place in cases of homicide, the
result of which determined whether the accused should be admitted to bail or im-
prisoned till he was finally tried."
22 OHIO LAWS, ch. 151, § 4, Feb. 4, 1807, repealing and substantially re-en-
acting OHIO LAWS, ch. 125 § 3, did not separate the statute sections in terms of the
grade offense accused; the sitting of the court was made by request; a three day
notice and a fifteen day period was substituted, and the sheriff automatically ap-
pointed the date of the court. Later, the time limit was completely abolished, mak-
ing only a three day notice to the associate judges required, OHIO LAWS, ch. 158
§ 14, Feb. 17, 1808 repealing and substantially re-enacting OHIO LAWS, ch. 151.
Chapter 158, also required the court to compel the attendance of wituesses. In
1810 the clerk of courts and prosecuting attorney were required to be notified,
OHIO LAWS ch. 243, §§ 106-108, Feb. 16, 1810, repealing and substantially re-en-
acting OHIO LAWs, ch. 158.
Further history: OHIO LAws, ch. 384, § 108, Feb. 23, 1816 repealed OHIO LAWS,
ch. 243, without re-enacting the same. OHIO LAWS, ch. 386 § 1, Feb. 26, 1816 en-
acted the same examining court provision as formerly, with slight change. Enact-
ment and repeal: OHIO LAWS, ch. 597 § 1 (1824) ; 29 OHIO LAWS 155 § 1 (1831);
50 OHIO LAWS 97 § 1 (1852) ; 66 OHIO LAWS 287, 294 § 48 (1869).
23 50 OHIO LAWS 97, March 12, 1852, repealing OHIO LAWS, ch. 832.
24 66 OHIO LAWS 287-335, May 6, 1869. The Act was in 10 titles. Title II
was "Of Arrest, Examination, Committment and Bail"; Article II consisted of
"Examination" (sections 30-42) and Article III was "Bail" (sections 43-66). Re-
garding the source of the Code, compare the original Field Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure with Livingston's Code, printed at 2 LIVINGSTON, CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE
237 (1873).
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the same as before: inquiry into the complaint, discharge or recognizance. 2
Later, county-wide jurisdiction was curtailed and limited to cases instituted
in the justice court by the prosecutor, sheriff, or other enumerated offi-
cials.
26
The organizetion of the Code of Criminal Procedure brought to
Ohio a long overdue, specifically defined preliminary examination of first
instance. Prior to 1869 the Examining Court was the only dependable
legal safeguard offered to an accused. The Code, however, explicitly de-
fined the preliminary examination, the foundation for that criminal pro-
cedure until the present reorganization of 1959. In short the Code pro-
vided for delivery of an arrested person and the warrant, to a proper
magistrate. Pleas were permitted; guilty on a misdemeanor charge if on
complaint of the party injured, in the magistrate's discretion. The accused
was to be bound over to the common pleas court automatically if proable
cause was found-where the injured party did not complain.2 A finding
of probable cause justified recognizance of witnesses, and hail for the ac-
cused in felony cases-if the offense was bailable.2" If no probable cause
was found, the accused was to be discharged.2"
Because of this new procedure of first instance, the Examining Court
took on a completely different function. The Court became a further
safeguard, after the preliminary examination, significant where the offense
charged was not bailable, or where bail required by the magistrate was
financially beyond the means of the accused. Furthermore the Court pro-
vided a more stringent search for probable cause, and the Court could
require bail of a different amount than the magistrate; viz: within the
accused's means. The contrast between the Examining Court legislation,
as it appeared in the 1869 Code, and the earlier legislation referred to
above, is significant.3 0
25 All prior justice of the peace criminal procedural acts were repealed by
66 OHIo LAWS 287 § 225 (1869), except §§ 24-29 and 33 of 35 OHIo LAWS 87,
March 27, 1837 (forms and constables). 66 OHIo LAWS 287 §§ 1, 13, 23 and 30
re-established existing procedure.
26 113 OHIO LAWS 123 (1929). Analagous county court section, see present
OHIO REv. CODE § 2931.02 (1958).
27 66 OHIo LAWS 287, at 292, 293, §§ 30, 31 and 34 (1869).
28 66 OHIo LAWS 287, at 293, 294, §§ 35-41, and 43 (1869).
29 66 OHIO LAws 287, at 293 § 37 (1869).
30 66 OHIo LAWS 287 at 294, § 48 (1869), "When any person shall have been
committed to jail charged with the commission of any crime or offense, and wishes
to be discharged from such imprisonment, the sheriff or jailor shall forthwith give
to the probate judge, clerk and prosecuting attorney of the proper county, at least
three day's notice of the time of holding an examining court, whose duty it shall
be to attend, according to such notice, at the court house; and said judge having
examined the witnesses (the person charged included, if such person shall re-
quest an examination), shall discharge the accused, if he finds there is no probable
cause for holding him to answer; otherwise he shall admit him to bail or remand
to jail; and said probate judge shall have power to adjourn from day to day,
during such examination, or for such longer period as he shall deem necessary
[Vol. 20
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With the institution of a magistrate's preliminary examination estab-
lished in the first stage of criminal proceedings, the era of structural de-
velopment was at an end. The justice of the peace "inquiry" statute re-
mained, as did the very important procedure of the Examining Court. The
shift from the 1870's to the 19 5 0 's was one of legislative clarification,
rather than basic fundamental change. 3 ' Introduction to the new pro-
cedure, however, calls upon a different theme. Basic theory, of course,
remains stable, and judicial duties as well as individual rights are shaped
around the practice as it developed. But, the procedure is characteristically
different.
THE NEw PROCEDURE
Reorganization of the preliminary examination is grounded upon two
basic but important premises: formal chronological organization, and fore-
most protective opportunity for the individual. In such a proceeding the
stress must be principally upon efficiency and utility, combined with suf-
ficient safeguards for the accused. Practical formality in the new legisla-
tion should ideally satisfy demands by prosecution, defense, and judiciary,
for efficient yet protective administration of criminal justice.
While a few sections of the old procedure remain unchanged,32 the
new process is a fresh innovation. Categorically the logical organization of
the preliminary examination lends itself to a division composed of several
steps or phases.
Informing the Accused-Opening Announcement One accused of
crime-felony or misdemeanor-must be brought before a court or mag-
istrate3" either pursuant to arrest, or upon summons or notice. Section
2937.02 provides that the first duty of the court or magistrate in all cases
for the furtherance of justice, on good cause shown by the state or accused."
31 Subsequent development from 1869 to the present.
(a) Preliminary examination: See 73 OHio LAws 219 (1876) ; 80 OHio LAws 141
(1883) ; 82 OHIo LAWS 149 (1885) ; 92 OHIo LAWS 98 (1896). From 1910-1952 the
following were added: 113 OHIo LAWS 123, ch. 12 §§ 2,4,5,12,13,19 (1929) ; 114
OHIo LAWS 320, 479 (1930).
(b) Justice of the Peace. See 113 OHIO LAWS 123, 215 (1929). The successor to
the justice of the peace court, in 1958, the county court, has substantially the same
criminal jurisdiction as the former, see OHIO REV. CODE § 2931.02 (1958): ". . . on
view or on sworn complaint, to cause a 'person, charged with the commission of
a felony or misdemeanor, to be arrested and brought before him or another judge
of a county court, and ... to inquire into the complaint and either discharge or
recognize him to be and appear before the proper court ...or otherwise dispose
of the complaint . .. ."
(c) Examining Court: See 113 OsIo LAWS 123, 215 (1929); 115 OHIO LAWS 530
(1933). For structural changes from inception to 1869 see note 22 supra.
32 OHIo REv. CODE §§ 2937.16 (recognizance of witnesses)'; 2937.17 (recogni-
zance for minor); 2937.18 (witness' refusal to enter into recognizance) ; 2937.20
(court disqualified to act) (1953).
33The definition of magistrate under former procedure controls; OHIO REV.
CODE § 2931.01 (1957).
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is to make an opening informative announcement to the accused, includ-
ing: the nature of the charge, and the identity of the complainant, per-
mitting the accused or his counsel to see and read the affidavit, complaint,
or a copy; that the accused has the right to -have counsel immediately and
the right to a continuance to enlist aid of counsel; a statement about the
effect of a plea of Guilty, Not Guilty, and-in misdemeanor cases-No
Contest. And, the accused must be appraised of his right to trial by jury
and the necessity of making a written demand. If the offense charged is
a felony, the accused must be informed of the nature and extent of pos-
sible punishment, and of his right to what is termed in the statutes, a pre-
liminary hearknngY
./rraignment The second step, section 2937.03, requires reading the
substance of the affidavit or complaint to the accused, unless he waives
such a reading. This is a first stage arraignment, within the preliminary
examination. At this point in the proceeding, inquiry is made by the judge
or magistrate as to whether the accused understands the nature of the
charge. If there is no indication of understanding, the judge or magis-
trate must give a legal explanation to the accused. The absolute right to
counsel is here preserved with a provision requiring continuance"5 if the
accused has no counsel and wishes representation, the magistrate setting
bail if the offense is bailable. In cases where the offense is not bailable or
where the accused cannot make bail, an excellent protective provision re-
quires that the officer in custody make available a telephone for arrange-
ment for counsel or bail, or that the officer take a message to any attorney
within the municipality where the accused is confined. This should secure
adequate legal representation at the first instance.
Motions In cases where the accused does not desire counsel, or upon
the expiration of a granted continuance to engage counsel, the new pro-
cedure provides for a motion to dismiss the complaint or affidavit.3 6 The
motion may be either oral and ruled upon at presentation, or in writing
and set for argument at a later time, upon testimony or affidavits, where
necessary."7 The motion will be quite useful in misdemeanor cases where
technical flaws in form appear, or where the statute of limitations has run.
The accused has available any exception which could be asserted against an
indictment or information -by a motion to quash, a plea in abatement, or
demurrer.
Section 2937.05 provides for discharge of the accused upon the sus-
taining of a motion made, unless the defect can be corrected without
changing the nature of the charge. This is to be effected by amending the
34 The term is used within the statute for the first time, although admittedly
it has been much referred to in practice. 'Examination' now is the entire process,
misdemeanor and felony.
35 See note 48 infra.
36 Section 2937.04.
37 Proof by testimony or affidavits is permissible where "... the motion
attacks a defect in the record by facts extrinsic thereto . . . .", section 2937.04.
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complaint or filing a new affidavit, reswearing the affiant. The new section
should do away with the rather useless procedure of "amending the war-
rant," provided for in the past." The sustaining af any motion, of course,
is not a bar to further prosecutions-felony or misdemeanor.
Pleas Upon the disposition of any motions, or if no motions are made,
the next step in section 2937.06 requires the accused to formally plead
to the charge. Here -the statutory arrangement draws a procedural distinc-
tion between misdemeanors and felonies, but pleas are mandatory in either
instance.
Misdemeanors
A person accused of a misdemeanor is entitled to one of four pleas,
and a plea will have the effect of waiving any objection that could have
been raised by previous motion. 9 The plea of Guilty, used quite exten-
sively in traffic cases, is receivable by the court or magistrate unless he be-
lieves it has been made because of mistake or fraud, in which case a plea
of Not Guilty is entered. Upon an explanation of surrounding circum-
stances from the affiant, complainant or his representative, and a state-
ment of the accused, sentence is pronounced or that matter continued.
A plea of No Contest-new in Ohio-is permitted and authorized
by the new procedure in misdemeanor cases only. The plea has the useful
aspect of not being subject to construction of an admission of guilt in a
later civil or criminal action. This makes for a very valuable change in
our procedural law. The plea constitutes a stipulation that the judge or
magistrate may make a finding of guilty or not guilty from the explana-
tion of circumstances, imposing sentence or continuance accordingly. 40
When an accused pleads Not Guilty or Once in Jeopardy, the other
two permissible misdemeanor pleas, the matter must be set for trial before
a court or jury, depending upon circumstances. A dual distinction is estab-
lished in the new procedure. If the charge is a misdemeanor in a court of
record, the trial may be set for a future time, with the accused let to bail
in the interim, or with the consent of the prosecutor and accused, set for
disposition forthwith. If the court is not of record, and the offense does
not require a jury trial, trial may be set in the future, or forthwith, if
prosecutor and accused consent. 4'
In a court not of record, where the right to a jury trial exists, the
matter cannot be tried by the magistrate unless the accused waives a jury
and consents to be tried by the magistrate in writing. When there is no
waiver the cause is to be transferred to a court of record within the county,
with the accused recognized to appear, if necessary. It is expressly pro-
38SReport of Criminal Law Committee, 31 OHIo BAR 411, 431 (May 12, 1958).
39 Section 2937.06.
40 Section 2937.07.
41 Section 2937.08.
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vided that this transfer will not require the filing of any indictment or in-
formation. 4
2
The new section effectively precludes jury trials in courts which
probably are not well equipped to provide them.43
Felonies
Where the offense charged is a felony, only a plea of Not Guilty or
a written plea of Guilty is permitted. The requirement of a written Guilty
plea is an innovation of obvious merit. Before accepting a plea of Guilty
the court or magistrate is required to advise the accused that the plea con-
stitutes an admission which may be used against him at trial. When the
accused enters a written Guilty plea or pleads Not Guilty and waives the
right to have evidence taken, the magistrate or court has the option of
either determining automatic probable cause-binding the accused to the
Common Pleas court pursuant to indictment, or proceeding with the taking
of evidence. Thus, the accused's waiver may or may not be effective. The
automatic finding is permissive and not mandatory.4 4
Upon a plea of Not Guilty, or when the accused does not plead-
and a plea of Not Guilty is entered for him4 5-or if the waiver of ex-
amination on a Guilty or Not Guilty plea is refused by the court or
magistrate, the matter is automatically continued for hearing unless the
prosecutor and accused consent to a hearing forthwith.4 The effect of this
provision should curtail the much criticized perpetual continuance, 47 since
the ten day limit has been rephrased and enacted within the new pro-
cedure.4
8
Proceedings at the Preliminary Hearing The "hearing"-the last-
stage felony procedure of the preliminary examination,41 will have been
4 2 Ibid.
43 "An additional objective of this proposal is to permit transfers to "courts
of record" generally, not merely to Common Pleas Court, which frequently means
running speeding and right of way cases through the grand jury at great bother
and little gain." Report of Criminal Law Committee, note 38, supra at 433.
44 Section 2937.09. This section makes the preliminary hearing dispensable
where it may not be expeditious or desirable.
45 Section 2937.06.
46 Section 2937.10. "This provides for automatic continuance for hearing un-
less all concerned consent." Report of Criminal Law Committee, note 38, supra at
434.
47 For example, an article appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer declaring:
"Fed up with the Municipal Court continuances given a frequently arrested man
who is charged with three felonies .. . detectives yesterday asked for and got
assurance that the cases could be presented directly to the grand jury." Cleveland
Plain Dealer, April 11, 1958, p. 14, col. 1.
48 Section 2937.21 provides that no continuance at any stage, including that
given for determination of a motion extend for more than 10 days, unless the
accused and the state consent. Continuance or delay in ruling contrary to the
10 day provision, unless procured by the accused or his counsel is grounds for dis-
charge of the accused forthwith.
49 "Hearing" appears in sections 2937.02, 2937.10, 2937.11, 2937.15. See note
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set at the pleading stage, or held at once with both parties' consent. The
procedure will begin with the prosecutor stating the case for the state, al-
though he is not required to do this. An examination of witnesses and in-
troduction of exhibits for the state follows. The rules of evidence pre-
vailing in criminal trials are binding here, with the accused and the mag-
istrate having the full right of cross examination. Cross-examination under
past procedure had been a presumed right,"' based upon the language "The
rules of evidence in civil causes, where applicable, govern in all criminal
causes." 51 And statements of witnesses given at the preliminary examina-
tion can be admitted at later trial under certain circumstances. 2
The accused under the new procedure may examine any exhibits of
the state prior to their introduction at the hearing. Furthermore, separa-
tion of witnesses is provided, as under the old procedure, upon motion of
the state or accused.5
3
Section 2937.12 provides the key points of the hearing:
(A) At the conclusion of the presentation of the state's case
accused may move for discharge for failure of proof or may
offer evidence on his own behalf. Prior to the offering of evi-
dence on behalf of the accused, unless accused is then repre-
sented by counsel, the court or magistrate shall advise accused:
(1) That any testimony of witnesses offered by him in
the proceeding may, if unfavorable in any particular, be used
against him at later trial;
(2) That accused himself may make a statement, not
under oath, regarding the charge, for the purpose of explain-
ing facts in evidence;
(3) That he may refuse to make any statement and such
refusal may not be used against him at trials;
(4) That any statement he makes may be used against
him at trial.
5 4
34, supra.
50 A.L.I. CODE OF CII. PRocED. § 46 (1930); Miller, The Preliminary Hear-
ing, 15 A.B.A.J. 414, 415 (1929); FED. R. CRINI. P. 5(c).
l1 OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.41 (1953).
5 These statements are admissible providing "... the witness . . . dies, or
becomes incapacitated to testify .... ", OHio REV. CODE § 2945.49 (1953);
see 15 OHio ,JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 415-421 (1955). Good cause must be shown
for the witness' incapacitation in order to admit the earlier testimony, Mitchell v.
State, 40 Ohio App. 367, 178 N.E. 325 (1931).
53 Section 2937.11.
54 Under former practice pleas and admissions against interest were long
accepted as competent evidential matters. State v. Jackson, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 229
(1937); Booker v. State, 33 Ohio App. 338, 169 N.E. 588 (1929); cf. Smith v.
State, 24 Ohio C.C. Dec. 526 (1912) where the examining magistrate was per-
mitted to testify at the trial to an admission of guilt made before him. See also,
Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1335 (1942). The limit of admissibility is the use of "Forced
confessions" and the use of the "third degree." See generally MORELAND, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 91-99 (1959); Warner, How Can The Third Degree Be
Eliminated? I BILL OF Ri(ossy REv. 24 (1940); Kauper, Judicial Examination of
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(B) Upon conclusion of all the evidence and the statement, if
any, of the accused, the court or magistrate shall either:
(1) Find that the crime alleged has been committed and
that there is probable and reasonable cause to hold or recognize
defendant to appear before the court of common pleas of the
county or any other county in which venue appears, for trial
pursuant to indictment by grand jury;
(2) Find that there is probable cause to hold or recognize
defendant to appear before the court of common pleas for trial
pursuant to indictment or information on such other charge,
felony or misdemeanor, as the evidence indicates was commit-
ted by accused;
(3) Find that a misdemeanor was committed and there
is probable cause to recognize accused to appear before himself
or some other court inferior to the court of common pleas for
trial upon such charge;
(4) Order the accused discharged from custody.
This formal "finding" section is well amplified by the new probable
cause test of section 2937.13:
In entering a finding, pursuant to section 2937.12 of the Re-
vised Code, the court, while weighing credibility of witnesses,
shall not be required to pass on the weight of the evidence and
any finding requiring accused to stand trial on any charge shall
be based solely on the presence of substantial credible evidence
thereof. No appeal shall lie from such decision nor shall the dis-
charge of defendant be a bar to further prosecution by indict-
ment or otherwise.
When evidence is brought out at the hearing that there is probable
cause to believe that the accused committed a crime other than the one
charged, either misdemeanor or felony, there is a provision within the
new procedure for filing ". . . with the papers in the case the text of the
charge found by him (court or magistrate) to be sustained by the evi-
dence." 55 This has the effect of bringing the altered charge before the
grand jury, or in the case of misdemeanor, before another magistrate.
The mere amendment of the warrant, under the old procedure, did not
accomplish this.
The final provisions of the new preliminary examination define sub-
poena service limitations, 5 and the time duration of continuances.
57
ISSUES, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES
With the new era of criminal procedure in Ohio, several areas of
legal significance are comment worthy, as their importance will undoubt-
the Accused-A Remedy For the Third Degree, 30 MIcH. L. REV. 1224 (1932).
5 5 Section 2937.14.
56 Section 2937.19, (Complaints to keep the peace, within the county; mis-
demeanors and ordinance offenses, anywhere within the state within one hundred
miles of the place where the court or magistrate is scheduled to sit; in felony cases.,
service anywhere within the state).
57 Section 2937.21, supra note 48.
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edly be realized in future practice. First, the primary issue in felony mat-
ters, a workable concept of "probable cause", and secondly the vested
right of an accused to the preliminary examination. Of further signifi-
cance are the additional safeguards an accused has at his disposal.
The Concept of Probable Cause The issues to be decided at the
hearing, in felony matters, are whether a crime has been committed, and
whether the accused is probably guilty of that crime. In discussing the is-
sues involved, the theories have been stated in terms of probability because
the presumption of innocence prevails from the hearing to the grand jury's
findings, and throughout the trial. The clearest case against the accused
will still be phrased in terms of "probable guilt".
The new definition of probable cause, referred to above, while much
more verbal than previous statutes still is subject to possible ambiguity-
particularly upon varying fact patterns. To fully appreciate its state-
ment, it must be read in the light of previous judicial interpretation.
The test used for the determination of discharge or "binding over"
has been stated in several ways. Early Ohio phraseology was in terms of
suspicion. For example, in 1798 the criteria was; "suspected to be
guilty." '' s This can be contrasted with the long statement in 1806 that
".. . if the said court shall be of opinion from the testimony that it is not
sufficient to create a suspicion of guilt, then the said court shall dismiss
such criminal . . . ."5 The more orthodox "probable cause" test was intro-
duced into practice with the adoption of the Criminal Code of Procedure
in 18690 and carried forward into recent practice, qualified by the neces-
ity that ". . . it appears that an offense has been committed .... ""
A classic theoretical interpretation of "probable cause" was given
within an early Ohio reference:
The question of probable cause is a mixed proposition of law
and fact: whether the circumstances alleged to show it probable
or not probable are true, and existed, is a matter of fact; but
whether, supposing them true, they amount to a probable cause,
is a question of law .... 62
It is clear that indubitable proof of guilt was never a necessary
criterion." Rather, the element sought was a "probable connection" with
the crime.64 The articulate phraseology of Chief Justice John Marshall,
58LAWS OF THE NORTHwEsT TERRITORY, ch. 77, May 1, 1798. "Suspicion" as a
criteria is traceable to the first justice of the peace acts in England; 34 Edw. 3,
c.l, (repealed) (1360).
59 OHIO LAWS, ch. 125 § 3, Jan. 27, 1806.
60 66 OHIO LAWS 287, 293 §§ 37, 38 (1869).
61127 OHIO LAWS 1039, 1101 § 1 (1957) (former OHIO REv. CODE § 2937.11
effective 1-1-58) derived from 113 O-no LAws 123, 147 ch. 12 §§ 10,11 (1929).6 2 Ash v. Marlow, 20 Ohio 119 (1851) n.1.
63 See an extensive early discussion in U.S. v. Lumsden, 26 Fed. Cas. 1013
(No. 15,641) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856).
64 U.S. v. Thieman, 15 Ohio Law Reporter 250, 251 (comm'r opinion 1917).
Present federal practice is governed by the 'probable cause' test; see FED. R.
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sitting as committing magistrate to hear the charge of high treason against
Aaron Burr, typifies the classic viewpoint:
On an application of this kind I certainly should not require that
proof which would be necessary to convict the person to be
committed, on a trial in chief; nor should I even require that
which should absolutely 'convince my own mind of the guilt of
the accused; but I ought to require, and I should require, that
probable cause be shown; and I understand probable cause to
be a case made out by proof furnishing good reasons to believe
that the crime alleged has been committed by the person charged
with having committed it.65
In contrast to the classic view is the English prima facie theory.
While the same result possibly might be reached, the application to particu-
lar facts is quite different. Upon the introduction of a certain quantum of
evidence by the prosecution, a presumption arises. The burden then shifts
to the accused to rebut the presumption. But to reach the stage of the
Jrima facie case means: (a) more than a mere possibility or probability
that the accused committed the crime; and (b) once the presumption has
been attained, the theory is that if it remained uncontradicted at the trial,
a reasonable jury could convict upon it alone.66 The important distinction
is that if it is thought that a jury would not convict on the evidence brought
out at the preliminary examination, the charge should be dismissed-the
effect of the strong presumption. 67
Indicative of a clear-cut modern approach to defining probable cause
in Ohio is the well reasoned standard found in a recent unreported mu-
nicipal court magistrate's opinion.6" The court stated three issues which the
CRIM. P. 5 (c) ; HousEL AND WALSER, DEFENDING AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL CASES 228-247 (1946). See also, A.L.I. CODE OF CRIM. PROCED. §§ 54, 55
(1930) ; Miller, supra note 50 at 415.
65 U.S. v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 2, 12 (No. 14,692a) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
66 "Magistrates do not, as Lord Goddard, C.J., pointed out in Card v.
Salmon (1953) 2 W.L.R. 301 .. .come to any decision when they are sitting as ex-
amining justices inquiring into an indictable offence; they merely reach a con-
clusion whether or not a prima facie case has been made out to send for trial. It
follows that magistrates so acting have no power to state a case on a point of
law, for no point of law can arise at that stage for their final decision." Pro-
ceedings Preliminary to Trial on Indictment, 97 SOL. J. 650 (1953).
67 Canada too, follows the English rule, R. v. Cowden, (1947) 90 C.C.C.
101; Ex Parte Reid, (1954) 110 C.C.C. 260. See Savage, Preliminary Inquiries,
1 THE CRIM. LAW Q. 77, 79 (1958). Some American jurisdictions have adopted
the prima facie theory in essence, see e.g., 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 337 (1940).
68 State v. Dolvin, Municipal Court of Warren, Ohio. Case No. S40649
(1957). The accused was arrested on an affidavit charging premeditated homicide,
pleading not guilty. At the preliminary hearing, direct and cross examination of
four witnesses for the state showed: (a) the gun found in the accused's home
did not ballistically match the gun from which the fatal bullet was fired; (b) the
deceased's wife testified that the accused and her husband were good friends, and
that she did not know where the deceased had gone prior to his death. The
Municipal court sustained the accused defendant's motion to dismiss the af-
fidavit and discharged him, finding: (i) no witnesses testified to connection of the
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State of Ohio must prove in any preliminary examination: (1) that the
Court has jurisdiction; (2) that a crime has been committed; and (3)
that the accused is probably guilty of the commission of the crime. A help-
ful explanation of probable cause is posed:
Probable cause may be defined as a reasonable ground of suspi-
cion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a belief that the person accused is guilty of the of-
fense with which he is charged.
Further, by probable cause is meant merely appearances which
justified the complaining witness in thinking the defendant
guilty. There must be something of reasonable certainty that
will convince the ordinary mind of the guilt of the defendant,
such circumstances and surrounding facts that would lead a
person of ordinary prudence to believe in his guilt. When such
facts exist there is probable cause. A person is not bound to have
evidence which will insure a conviction or absolutely convince
him of the defendant's guilt but merely evidence sufficient to
justify an honest belief in the guilt of the accused, or such cir-
cumstances must exist as would justify and warrant a reason-
able, cautious and prudent man in believing that the accused
is guilty.69
From the nebulous language of the Ohio statutes in the past "prob-
able cause" in the magistrate's court has been susceptible to a full circle's
interpretation: from a reasonable intelligent practical view, noted above,
to mere discretionary conclusion. Any worthwhile concept of probable
cause must have substance. It must mean reference to a balanced definite
standard. Until the present reorganization any standard drawn has been
unclear. In some cases magistrates have undoubtedly referred to no partic-
ular standard at all; resting their holding upon "appearances" or worse
yet, a reluctance to dismiss the accused. Criminal prosecution is destined
to stigmatize an individual, via societal pressure. It is only fair that stand-
ards used should be capable of equal interpretation. Fortunately the new
legislation seems to be a step in the direction of justice, regarding future
intrepretations of probable cause.
The Right to a Preliminary Examination The breadth of an ac-
cused's rights regarding the examination is limited by duration of time:
from arrest to indictment-which in Ohio makes the preliminary exam-
ination moot,7" because the grand jury has substituted their finding of
accused with the deceased at either the scene of death or any other place proximate
to the time of death; (ii) ballistics showed no evidence that the accused's gun
had been the murder weapon. Thus, the court stated that ". . . the State of Ohio,
has failed to prove by the evidence introduced in this case that the defendant
was probably guilty of the offense charged." State v. Dolvin, supra at 9.
60Id. at 2.
70 See Harper v. State, 7 Ohio St. 73 (1857) ; Newberry v. State, 7 Ohio C.C.
Dec. 626 (1897). Contra, e.g., CAL. CoNsr. art, I, § 8; 14 Am. JUR. Grim. Law
§ 240 (1938) ; U.S. v. Powlowski, 270 Fed. 285 (E.D. Penn. 1921) ; U.S. v. Kerr,
159 Fed. 185 (E.D. Penn. 1908).
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probable cause. Preliminary examination is not-unfortunately-a pre-
requisite for indictment in Ohio.71
There is no Federal Constitutional right to a preliminary examina-
tion,7 2 and although our state courts have never squarely ruled on the
question, it is very doubtful that there is an Ohio Constitutional right in-
volved.
7 3
Strict observance of statutory provisions relating to criminal prosecu-
tions generally is essential to the jurisdiction of the court to convict74 but
a lack or defect of the preliminary examination does not effect the trial
court's jurisdiction when there is a proper indictment. 75
Before indictment, a different approach obtains. There is no doubt
that an accused may compel a preliminary examination before indictment,
since the procedure is a statutory right. The appropriate remedy is man-
damus, adequately supported by Ohio authority.76 A major defect in the
preliminary examination discovered either during the examination or while
the accused is awaiting a grand jury's decision should be ground for juris-
dictional attack.77 This may be done by a writ of prohibition to cease the
magistrate's examination,78 or by a writ of habeas corpus, where the ac-
71 Ibid.
72The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a
preliminary examination, Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1930); Ocampo v.
U.S., 234 U.S. 91 (1914).
73 Cf. Van Dam v. U.S., 23 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1928) ; Harper v. State, supra
.note 70.
74 Goodin v. State, 16 Ohio St. 344 (1865); see 15 OHIO JUR.2d Crim. Law
30 (1955).
75 State v. Miller, 96 Ohio App. 216, 121 N.E.2d 660, (1953) appeal dismissed,
161 Ohio St. 467, 119 N.E.2d 618 (1954) ; Bowman v. Alvis, 88 Ohio App. 229, 96
N.E.2d 605 (1950). But cf. State v. Joiner, 28 Ohio Dec. 199, 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
313 (1917).
76 OHIO REv. CODE §§ 2725.01-.28 (1953). See State ex rel Maag v. Schuller,
154 Ohio St. 465, 96 N.E.2d 401 (1951); 35 AM. JUR. Mandamus, § 296 (1941);
25 OHIO JUR. Mandamus, § 212 (1932); 35 OHIO JUR.2d Mandamus, § 126
(1959). Mandamus cannot control judicial discretion; only judgment and func-
tions, OHIO REv. CODE § 2731.03 (1953).
77 An example of such a defect is deprivation of the right to counsel. OHIO
CONsT. art I § 10 (1851) provides: ". . . In any trial, in any court, the party ac-
cused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel . .. ."
Assuming that Ohio would follow the better view, that the Federal Constitution
and state constitution require the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing, e.g.,
Lambus v. Kaiser, 352 Mo. 122, 176 S.W.2d 494 (1943), see contra, Roberts v.
State, 145 Neb. 658, 17 N.W.2d 666 (1945), a magistrate depriving the accused
of counsel would lose jurisdiction, and apparently all process would become void
ab initio, see In Re Motz, 100 Ohio App. 296, 136 N.E.2d 430 (1955). See also
historical discussion in Deckler v. State, 113 Ohio St. 512, 150 N.E. 74 (1925)
Note, Right to Counsel Prior to Trial, 44 Ky. L.J. 103 (1955).
78 State ex rel Micheel v. Vamos, 144 Ohio St. 628, 60 N.E.2d 305 (1945) ; 32
OHIO Jul. Prohibition, §§ 21, 22 (1934). A theory has been constructed whereby
mandamus is utilized to complete dismissal of the preliminary hearing, Inverarity
v. Zumwalt, 87 Okla. Crim. 294, 262 P.2d 725 (1953).
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cused is confined.7"
Postponement of the examination beyond, or contrary to statutory pro-
visions has meant automatic loss of jurisdiction for many years if the ac-
cused did not consent.80 This requirement of some expediency, as enacted
into the new procedure, is justified in State ex rel Micheel v. Vamos,
... past experience has demonstrated that prosecutions too long
delayed often amounts to persecution ... it has always been the
policy of our law to guarantee the accused a speedy public trial.
We fined such a provision written into the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States (which applies to prosecu-
tions in federal courts) and into the Constitution of Ohio .... 81
Additional Safeguards Although the provisions of Amended Senate
Bill No. 73, as enacted, create a wide reorganization of minor court
criminal procedure in addition to the preliminary examination, and there-
fore not within the scope of this article, several procedural safeguards
outside of the preliminary examination sections are here relevant.
The first is an important civil rights section allegedly based upon the
Examining Court procedure, which should dissuade overzealous authori-
ties from confining persons for any length of time without first bringing
them before a magistrate. Section 2935.16 states:
When it comes to the attention of any judge or magistrate that
a prisoner is being held in any jail or place of custody in his
jurisdiction without committment from a court or magistrate,
he shall forthwith, by summary process, require the officer or
person in charge of such jail or place of custody to disclose to
such court or magistrate, in writing, whether or not he holds
the person described or identified in the process and the court
under whose process the prisoner is being held. If it appears
from the disclosure that the prisoner is held solely under war-
rant of arrest from any court or magistrate, the judge or mag-
istrate shall order the custodian to produce the prisoner forth-
with before the court or magistrate issuing the warrant and if
such be impossible for any reason, to produce him before the
inquiring judge or magistrate. If it appears from the disclosure
that the prisoner is held without process, such judge or mag-
istrate shall require the custodian to produce the prisoner forth-
with before him, there to be charged as provided in section
2935.06 of the Revised Code. Whoever, being the person in
temporary or permanent charge of any jail or place of confine-
79 OHIO CONsr. art I § 8 (1851); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2725.01, .02, .05
(1953); 26 OHIO JUR.2d Habeas Corpus § 12 (1957). Cf., In Re Motz, supra
note 77; Re Lockhart, 157 Ohio St. 192 (1952).
80 115 OHIO LAWS 530 § 1 (1933) (former OHIO Ray. CODE § 2937.02); a ten
day provision in present section 2937.21. Earlier Ohio law provided for 20 days
limit, 66 OHIO LAws 287, 292 § 32 (1869). And see A.L.I. CODE OF CRIM. PROCED.
§ 43 (1930), none more than two days, nor shall exceed in all, six days. See the
very interesting case of State v. Ferguson, 100 Ohio App. 191, 135 N.E.2d 884
(1955).
81 S5upra, note 78 at 631.
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ment, violates this section shall be fined not less than one hun-
dred nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more
than ninety days, or both.
This new section is a very important tool to protect one detained
unlawfully. And, while the purpose stated by the draftsmen of the sec-
tion was to augment the Examining Court provision and broaden its
scope, 2 it seems doubtful whether the Examining Court, under the prem-
ises discussed above is now intended for detention of first instance." In
any event the new section will adequately solve the problem of detention
in the first instance.
The second important safeguard is the utilization of the Examining
Court itself; a historic segment of Ohio criminal procedure, present sec-
tion 2937.34. And while appeal from a preliminary examination was al-
ways a rather moot point, because of its lack of finality,8 4 it is now clearly
precluded by the new procedure, section 2937.13. However, a substitute
for appeal is readily available to an accused in use of the Examining Court
procedure.
As referred to above, the Examining Court in its early version was
a hearing of first instance, serving the function of the present preliminary
examination. In the sole construction of the Examining Court procedure
during that era it was declared in State v. Dawson 5 that:
The statute directing the mode of calling an examining court,
has reference to a prisoner confined in jail, in vacation. The as-
sociate judges are to be notified; the prosecutor is to attend;
and it is only in such case, that an examination into the circum-
stances of the charge is required.8"
When the legislature created the preliminary examination, protecting
rights at the first instance in 1869, the Examining Court became a type of
Cappeal" procedure; a re-examination of the finding of probable cause. In
82 Report of Criminal Law Committee, note 38, supra at 427, 428 comment-
ing on the section stated: "This section is based on present 2937.34, where it is
largley buried among unrelated material, and brought into the light of day near
related matter. In addition it broadens the inquisitorial power to magistrates
generally, is available from the moment of arrest and eliminates the faintly illogi-
cal notion that a sheriff who is unlawfully holding a prisoner is going cheerfully
to carry messages from that prisoner to the common pleas judge." (referring to
the Examining Court provision).
83 See notes 21, 22, 25, 30, supra, and 87, 91, infra. The Examining Court
provision, OHIO REv. CoDE § 2937.34 (1953), is reprinted at note 90, infra.
84 See OHIO R . CoDE § 2953.05 (1953) ; cf. State v. Bevacqua, 147 Ohio St.
20, 67 N.E.2d 786 (1946); State v. Theisen, 91 Ohio App. 489, 108 N.E.2d 854
(1952). However the question seems to have been raised in a Supreme Court
dictum: "Whether the accused could appeal from the finding of . . . such
preliminary examinations would present a grave legal question which is un-
necessary of determination here.", State ex rel Micheel v. Vamos, supra note
78 at 633.
856 Ohio 251 (1834).
861d. at 253.
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effect this was a legislative overruling of the Dawson case." The Ohio
Supreme Court seemingly recognized this change of procedure when, in
1873, it announced its second and last construction, to date, of the Ex-
amining Court provision, in Kendle v. Tarbell:
88
(Section 48, the examining court provision, being in Article III-Bail, of
the act referred to; the preceding sections referred to were within
Article 11-Examination, sections 3 to 42, outlining the preliminary ex-
amination.) The Kendle case came up on facts where the petitioner had
been indicted. The importance of the case is its holding that Examining
Court procedure was not available after indictment, a condition subse-
quently written into the present statute. 90
A 1957 decision, representing the first court of appeals interpreta-
tion reported-and the third and final reported case involving Examin-
ing Court procedure-reaffirmed the Kendle rule that the court was avail-
able only before indictment. There is an indication in the case that the
fact of indictment will have the effect of ceasing any proceedings of the
Examining Court-to be held, or in progress, or appeal therefrom. A chal-
lenging question was raised but left unanswered by the court: can an ac-
cused appeal from the finding of the Examining Court? Since the de-
cision sustained the State's motion to dismiss the appeal for mootness, be-
cause the grand jury indicted, the question is left open.9'
In terms of contemporary practice, what value does the Examining
Court have? First, the procedure is available when an accused has been
committed to jail on the charge of a non-bailable offense. 2 Second, it is
87That the procedure was to take on a different aspect seems warranted
from the fact that the General Assembly in 1869 regrouped the examining court
statute with the sections on bail, 66 Omo LAws 87, 294 (1869). Whle a reading
of the statute alone might indicate that the procedure was one of first instance,
as in earlier practice, the maxim pari materia should control.
8824 Ohio St. 196 (1873).
And section 48 is intended to apply only to persons committed
on criminal charges, as provided in the preceding sections of the
act.
8 9
8 9 Id. at 200.
90 Present OHIO Rev. CODE § 2937.34 (1953) provides: "When a person is
committed to jail, charged with an offense for which he has not been indicted.
and claims to be unlawfully detained, the sheriff on demand of the accused or his
counsel shall forthwith notify the court of common pleas, and the prosecuting at-
torney, to attend an examining court, the time of which shall be fixed by the
judge. The judge shall hear said cause or complaint, examine the witnesses, and
make such order as the justice of the case requires, and for such purpose the
court may admit to bail, release without bond, or recommit to jail in accordance
with the commitment. In the absence of the judge of the court of common pleas,
the probate judge shall hold such examining court." For the legislative history of
this provision see note 22 supra.
91 Howell v. Keiter, 104 Ohio App. 28, 146 N.E.2d 452 (1957).
92 OHIO CoNsT. art. I § 9; bail for offenses, except those capital offenses where
the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt great. See 7 OHIo JUR.2d Bail
and Recognizance, § 9 (1954).
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available when an accused cannot give recognizance for pecuniary rea-
sons, and is committed to jail pending further action. Here the merit is
obvious. A re-analysis of bail is possible, and a resulting release from con-
finement-if the Examining Court decides bail may be lowered. Third,
the procedure should be available when an accused wishes to have the mag-
istrate's finding re-analyzed, and voluntarily refuses to give recognizance
in order that he may be committed to jail, giving him "standing" to re-
quest the Examining Court. With regard to the latter, it is apparent that
in many cases an accused will have been denied, through inadvertence, or
other reasons, an opportunity to convincingly present his case at the pre-
liminary examination and hearing. It may be that having heard some evi-
dence, defense counsel might be in a better position to rebut the case for
probable cause-saving his client the stigma of a public trial. Furthermore,
new witnesses might have been located, flaws developed in the state's case,
and so on. The Examining Court does give the opportunity to (1) prevent
the stigma accompanying a criminal trial; (2) present the refutation of
probable cause to a common pleas judge-in many cases more familiar
with criminal, and particularly felony prosecutions, and (3) have a more
formal atmosphere conducive to the rules of evidence, and closer to the
procedure of a trial.
The appraisal of the accused's case will rest upon the same criteria
as the magistrate applied in the hearing. Again the Examining Court will
look for probable cause93 in determining whether to discharge, release
without bond-recommit to jail, or admit the accused to bail.
The draftsmen of the new legislation in retaining the Examining
Court provision commented that ". . . This is retained although its virtues
are questionable and possibility of abuse great." 4 But understood in the
light of its background and development from 1806 through the Code of
1869, there should 'be no question as to its uesfulness and value. The pur-
pose of the process being its collateral safeguard for the accused, its neces-
sity is duly justified.
The combination of the new civil rights section and the Examining
Court process should greatly add to the newly reorganized preliminary
examination, making for efficiency and protection for the accused.
CONCLUSION
Any rule of conclusion to be drawn regarding the new preliminary
examination procedure is self evident. Contrasting the new procedure with
pre-existing practice, it is obvious that a new era of criminal administra-
93 Although the present statute is silent as to the test to be applied, it seems
that the tests written into the statute from its inception to the present should guide
interpretation: 1806-1808, opinion that there was a suspicion of guilt; 1808-1810,
as the judges thought proper; 1810-1816, opinion that the prisoner was triable at
common pleas; 1816-1831, a determination whether the prisoner ought to have been
discharged; 1831-1869, at the judges' or judge's discretion; 1869-1932, probable
cause. ,
94 Report of Criminal Law Committee, note 38 supra at 446.
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tion in Ohio should follow. The necessity for the new procedure was
stressed by the Bar Association's Commttee report, juxtaposing past
against present:
The existing arrest, preliminary hearing and trial of misdemean-
ors procedures are largely a product of 19th century rural Ohio.
They are built around the wise, but untutored, old Justice of
the Peace .. . dispensing a rough but effective justice to dis-
turbers of the peace around the kitchen table after the chores
were done ...The rural society is largely gone; the popula-
tion is more mobile; no salaried officer of the law-and no
trained lawyer-is more than 20 minutes away by telephone
or car. The Justice ... has degenerated and gone out of ex-
istence; the village mayor, as dispenser of justice, is on the way
out . . . Modernization has consisted of a few incongruities
• . . otherwise there is no form, no rhyme, no rule, no sys-
tem.
5
Now with the successful enactment of the Bill the responsibility lies with
the Practicing Bar. Many of the objections levelled at the procedure of
years past will be met by the new procedure. Opportunities heretofore
not available will now be within reach to accused and his counsel, just
as new duties will be trustfully placed upon the Judiciary. But, while the
theory of the new procedure is ideally suited to protect the rights of society
and those of the accused-the preliminary examination will fall far short
of its ideal unless its effect is carried out in practice.
In the past, prosecution and defense-as well as a segment of the
Judiciary-have viewed the procedure as largely perfunctory, when in
fact expense, delay, and time waste of court officials, jurors, and others
could have been avoided by determining-in a formal manner-whether
further prosecution was needed. And in the past, local administration has
stimulated ignorance of available procedure by judicial impatience and
custom.
Again-the responsibility is with the Bar. Local customs and the
familiarity with "the old rules" must not be allowed to cloud the benefits
inherent in the new procedure, rather they should succumb to a strict
observance of every letter of the new law.
Only through advocacy can established law become established uni-
form practice--a necessary ingredient of criminal justice.
95 Report of Criminal Law Committee, note 38 supra at 418.
